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Coordination mechanisms with mathematical programming models 
for decentralized decision-making, a literature review 
Rius-Sorolla G1, Maheut J, Estellés-Miguel S, Garcia-Sabater JP 
Abstract. The increase in the complexity of supply chains requires greater efforts to align the activities of all its 
members in order to improve the creation of value of their products or services offered to customers. In general, the 
information is asymmetric; each member has its own objective and limitations that may be in conflict with other 
members. Operations managements face the challenge of coordinating activities in such a way that the supply chain 
as a whole remains competitive, while each member improves by cooperating. This document aims to offer a 
systematic review of the collaborative planning in the last decade on the mechanisms of coordination in 
mathematical programming models that allow us to position existing concepts and identify areas where more 
research is needed.  
Keywords: systematic; coordination mechanism; deterministic; decentralized  
1. Introduction 
The new digital transformation era makes the coordination and coordination mechanisms research even 
more necessary. The Supply Chains (SC) are increasingly complex and distributed, composed by multiple 
organizations with different objectives and policies. Therefore, the SC have to coordinate their 
competitiveness when the end users do not need to know the location or characteristics of the required 
resources (Attanasio et al., 2006). 
Since the first appearance of SC concept in 1982 (Cooper et al., 1997), it was identified that competition 
was barely between firms but between SC, that need to be coordinated. In fact, they have to manage the 
improvement among the SC members. Therefore, it is necessary to link the objectives and activities 
between the SC organizations, in order to achieve the optimization of the whole, instead of seeking only 
the myopic optimization of local results. 
The breadth of coordination is between independent companies of a SC or inside clusters (Qu et al., 2015) 
or even within each organization (Behnamian, 2014). Stank (1999) studied the coordination processes 
within companies, which was characterized by effective communication, information exchange, 
partnership and performance monitoring. Since information is not equally available to all parties, 
asymmetric mechanisms are needed to ensure that the essential information is shared to make the right 
decisions (McAfee et al., 1987).  
Coordination is not only necessary when factories are at different locations, with different cultures 
(Maheut et al., 2014a) but also among different time spans (Maheut et al., 2014b). These and other 
elements will affect decision making on storage and distribution location, production or distribution 
schedules, inventory planning, etc. Furthermore, different levels inside organizations that constitute the 
SC can be involved, which must be equally coordinated. All of them, with the objective to make optimal 
operational decisions for their organization and also to the SC (Ertogral et al., 2000).  
Distributed asymmetric coordination mechanisms are necessary in organizations where centralized 
decision systems are impractical because their modelling is nonlinear and intractable, given the 
complexity of the facilities (Lu et al., 2012). So it is, when the Decision Systems are not able to react to 
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events in real time (Ouelhadj et al., 2009) or where reluctance to share information is found (Kutanoglu et 
al., 1999). 
Sahin and Robinson (2002) proposed that information sharing and coordination among members were the 
main drivers of SC performance, examining the literature on integration in the SC. Effective information 
management generates a remarkable supply chain improvement (Zhou et al., 2007). Surveys demonstrate 
the correlation between improved benefits with information sharing, incentive alignment and decision 
synchronization (Sridharan et al., 2009). 
In order to ensure coordination, contracts or mechanisms have been created (Whang, 1995) that allow 
local complexities to be managed, making decisions locally, wherever information is available, but taking 
into account global interests. The present work focuses on the mechanisms that allow the autonomous 
local planning and at the same time align the global interests through mathematical programming models. 
Mechanisms must hold the right incentives to align objectives among different actors (Fan et al., 2003). 
For example, it is found proportional sharing of global benefits (Ben-Daya et al., 2008), transfer pricing, 
buyback, flexible delivery, rebate (Mahdiraji et al., 2015), quantity discount (Lehoux et al., 2014), credit 
period (Arkan et al., 2012), share of risk, quantity flexibility (Jeong 2012), franchise rights (Chakraborty 
et al., 2015), etc. Collaboration will only continue if cooperation is perceived to bring benefits or greater 
value to each party (Cheng, 2011). A fully integrated solution can result in optimum performance for the 
system (Buxmann et al., 2008), but such a solution may not always be in the best interest of each member 
of the system (Li et al., 2007). Therefore, while in theory the best solution often means optimal, in 
practice, it will suffice that the results of the coordination have improved the overall result compared to 
the non-coordination (Stadtler et al., 2008). 
Since the work of Dantzig-Wolfe (1960) and Benders (1962), different solutions have been devised with 
respect to the coordination of the SC.  Important papers reviews such as (Arshinder et al., 2008; Badole et 
al., 2012; Jeong et al., 2002; Kumar et al., 2016; Li et al., 2007; Tang et al., 2016a), analyse different 
perceptions about the concept of "coordination" and the SC. But we find the literature review of Stadtler 
(2007) to be outstanding in its approach to coordination mechanisms of mathematical programming. That 
is why it has been started research in 2006 on coordination mechanisms in mathematical programming. 
The main contribution of our work is to present a review of the main papers related to the coordination 
mechanism on mathematical programming in the last ten years and reviewed following the taxonomy 
given by Stadtler (2007) ten years ago. 
The rest of the paper is structured as follows: first, a short description of the review methodology is 
introduced; second, a brief discussion of the results is presented; finally, the paper ends with a conclusion 
and future works. 
2. Review methodology 
The review has been carried out following the systematic literature review protocol presented and used by 
Marín et al. (2015) and Medina-Lopez et al. (2010). 
The steps proposed are: set the goal, select type of reference and data base, search filter and manage 
reference, extract information of selected reference and write the report. Therefore, it uses transparent 
procedure, to find, evaluate and synthesize the results of relevant research. The procedures are explicitly 
defined in advance to ensure that the exercise is transparent and can be replicated.  
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Our goal is to identify the coordination mechanisms for the allocation of resources and / or orders in the 
production planning between plants or companies within an organization or between different 
organizations within a supply chain. 
Our databases are mainly the scientific-technical bibliographic databases of Scopus and Web of Science 
(WoS), with access from the Universitat Politècnica of València, from 2006 to 2016. It has been started 
from year 2006 since we consider as a starting point the review of coordination mechanisms presented by 
Stadtler (2007).  
The search filter and inclusion criteria are related terms to our objectives of “coordination”, 
“mechanism”, “production”, “deterministic” and “decentralized” (see Table 1). For example 
“collaboration”, here, is referred to the means and efforts for common action between two or more parties 
in the SC, in order to obtain a better result than acting separately (Simatupang et al., 2006). 
Understanding that coordination requires collaboration (Albrecht, 2010).  
Table 1 Search elements. 
Search elements Search elements complemented with additional related terms. 
Coordination “coordination” OR “collaboration” OR “collaborate” OR “cooperation” OR “cooperate” OR “balanced” OR 
“coordinate” OR “participate” OR “collude” OR “conspire” OR “cooperate” OR “ join force” OR “ combine” 
Mechanism (“mechanism” OR “method” OR “system” OR “technique” OR “procedure” OR “instrument”) 
Decentral* (decentral* OR “asymmetric”) 
Production (“production” OR ”scheduling”) 
Integer “Integer” “deterministic” 
Source: Own elaboration 
The complete protocol and the search commands could be found in Rius-Sorolla et al. (2017). The results 
were 4.187 references preselected from the different search strategies and a resume could be viewed in 
Table 2. 
Table 2 Preselected papers from the different search commands and duplicate works, self-made from Mendeley© desktop. 
  
First search Second search Third Search 
  
Scopus  WoS WoS Scopus  WoS Scholar 
First search 
Scopus 1.143 24 74 10 5 9 
WoS 24 35 19 0 0 0 
Second search WoS 74 19 2.918 6 7 5 
Third Search 
Scopus 10 0 6 105 62 89 
WoS 5 0 7 62 69 60 
Scholar 9 0 5 89 60 186 
WoS Web of Science, Scholar scholar.google.com. Source: Own elaboration 
The exclusion criteria were applied to those articles that provide works on the benefits of its 
implementation, without introducing coordination mechanisms, such as literature reviews. In addition, 
those from other areas such as power generation, multi-agent systems, sensors, etc. have been excluded. 
Additionally, papers that seek coefficients, values or equilibrium functions from unknown or non-discrete 
demands, fuzzy techniques, and models based on game theory have been excluded. Finally, the search 
excludes papers that propose algebraic solutions like Joint Economic Lot Size Models (JELS), contract 
theories, centralized solutions to the problem, dynamic programming or CPFR (Collaborative Planning, 
Forecasting, and Replenishment) or are not related to mathematical programming models, which deal 
with distributed decision-making. The inclusion criteria were broad enough to ensure that no mechanism 
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is excluded, granting that the decision may generate numerous false positives. They can be found in 
(Rius-Sorolla et al., 2017), focused on publications using coordination mechanisms, applied or proposed 
for asymmetric information situations, decentralized and in the areas of production or production 
programming on tactical, operation or strategic decision level. 
Therefore, the exclusion criteria were applied first to their titles and summaries, and in a second phase to 
the full text review. A total of 59 papers have been selected for reviewing. Most of the citations were 
found on journals (89.7%), the others from conference (10.3%) (see Table 4). Six journals accounted for 
the 39.7% of the citations: International Journal of Production Economics, International Journal of 
Production Research Computers & Chemical Engineering, European Journal of Operational Research, 
IEEE Transactions on Automation Science and Engineering and Operations Research (see Table 4). Table 
3 shows the distribution of the coordination mechanism applied by years. For the 59 articles reviewed 18 
are based on the Lagrangian Relaxation (LR) with different heuristic to update the multiplier, 13 have 
used different meta-heuristics (MH) to find a coordination scene, 16 have used a hierarchy based protocol 
(HBP), 7 have used the Dantzig-Wolfe (DW) (1960) method, 4 have used auction mechanism (AM) to 
update the assignment and one has used Benders (1962) method.  
Table 3 Coordination mechanism of the selected references. 
Mechanism 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 Total 
Benders                 1     1 
AM 1 1    1     1 4 
DW   1 1   1       2 3   7 
HBP 1 1 3  4   2 1 1 3 16 
MH   1   1 2 2   2 1 4   13 
LR   3 2 1 2 1 1 1 2 4 18 
Total 2 4 7 3 8 5 1 5 6 10 8 59 
Benders decomposition approach from Benders (1962), AM action mechanism, DW as the Dantzig-Wolf (1960), HBP Hierarchy bases 
protocol, MH meta-heuristics LR Lagrangian relaxation 
Table 4 Journal or conference of the selected references. 
Publication References % Total 
International Journal of Production Economics 9 15% 
International Journal of Production Research 4 7% 
Computers & Chemical Engineering 3 5% 
European Journal of Operational Research 3 5% 
Computers & Industrial Engineering 2 3% 
IEEE Transactions on Automation Science and Engineering 2 3% 
Operations Research Letters 2 3% 
2010 International Conference on Systems Sciences 1 2% 
2010 World conference on Transport Research 1 2% 
2013 International Conference on Advanced Logistics and Transport, ICALT 2013 1 2% 
2014 IEEE Computational Intelligence in Production and Logistics Systems 1 2% 
2015 48th Hawaii International Conference on System Sciences 1 2% 
2015 IEEE Symposium Series on Computational Intelligence (IEEE Ssci) 1 2% 
2016 European Control Conference, ECC 2016 1 2% 
Agricultural Systems 1 2% 
Applied Soft Computing 1 2% 
Automatisierungstechnik 1 2% 
Building and Environment 1 2% 
Canadian journal of forest 1 2% 
Computers and Chemical Engineering 1 2% 
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Discrete Applied Mathematics 1 2% 
Electronic Commerce Research 1 2% 
European J. of Industrial Engineering 1 2% 
Forest Science 1 2% 
IEEE Transactions on Systems, Man, and Cybernetics  1 2% 
IFAC-PapersOnLine 1 2% 
International Journal of Computer Integrated Manufacturing 1 2% 
International Journal of Industrial Engineering: Theory Applications and Practice 1 2% 
International Journal of Information Processing and Management 1 2% 
International Journal of Information Technology & Decision Making 1 2% 
International Journal of Shipping and Transport Logistics 1 2% 
International Transactions in Operational Research 1 2% 
Journal of Engineering and Technology Management 1 2% 
Journal of Manufacturing Systems 1 2% 
Journal of Operations Research Quarterly  1 2% 
Journal of Process Control 1 2% 
Journal of the Operational Research Society 1 2% 
Lecture Notes in Computer Science 1 2% 
Logistics Management 1 2% 
Parallel Computing 1 2% 
Production Planning & Control 1 2% 
 
3. Research on coordination mechanism  
As a reference framework, in order to describe the main characteristics observed in the selected literature, 
it will be used part of the taxonomy already proposed by Stadtler (2007) and part used by Mula et al. 
(2010) which is described in Rius-Sorolla et al. (2017), all of them are briefly described below: 
Temporal level of the coordinated decision: Classify coordinated decisions based on the temporal scope, 
with the denomination of strategic or long-term, tactical or medium-term, and finally operational or short-
term. 
Structure and relationship between the members of the SC: It identifies the SC levels, the number of 
members in each level and the business that will be coordinated. 
Type of relationship between members of the SC: This approach consists in identifying if one of the 
members has more power than the other. In addition, the type of expected behaviour among members or 
behavioural assumptions is analysed, such as opportunistic or team behaviour or if possible opportunistic 
behaviours are evaluated. In addition, it includes the possible effects of learning in the negotiation and, 
finally, if the planning is proposed throughout the periods as rolling horizons. 
Objectives of coordination mechanism: Identification of the purpose of the coordination mechanism, how 
to align the requirements, which the supplier can satisfy the customer's requirements, or seek an optimal 
solution of the SC or a solution that works in a fair share of the coordination benefits. 
Models and steps in collaboration: This presents the type of mathematical programming model used to 
coordinate. Then, the phase in which the negotiation is considered. That is, if it is in the phase in which 
the collaboration conditions are negotiated, or in the planning, or in the execution phase, or finally in the 
evaluation phase, which allows the conditions to be renegotiated for the next phase. In addition, what 
information is shared to reach the collaboration and what is hidden by each member. 
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Characteristics of the implementation of the mechanism: This presents the type of mechanism and, if 
necessary, the figure of a mediator, the member who must originate the first proposal and the negotiation 
phases that must be exchanged to arrive at a solution and, finally, if compensation is proposed. 
Solutions quality and novelty: It includes the way in which the works evaluate the proposed solutions. It 
identifies the works that provide a demonstration of the convergence of the method. It determines those 
papers that perform a simulation of a case study; therefore, the evidence of the method will be limited to 
this situation. On the other hand, other works define a series of parameters and computational tests to 
validate said situations. 
3.1. Temporal level of the coordinated decision 
Huang et al. (2003) proposed as criteria to classify the temporal span of the decision. They define 
strategic decisions, in the long term, from 6 months to two years, such as pricing, postponement, capacity 
allocation, facility allocation. The tactical level is in the medium term, 2 weeks to 6 months, the decisions 
of safety stock, shipment plan, material requirement planning and production & transport plan. Finally, 
the operational decisions are in the short term, the daily decisions, those of ordering, inventory allocation, 
production scheduling and vehicle routing. In the 59 papers, the deadlines or the decisions level are not 
always defined by the authors. For example, Albrecht et al. (2015) present a proposal for a generic 
coordination mechanism for Sales and Operations Planning (S&OP), which could be both on a strategic 
or tactical level, but we opt for the tactical since they act more on production planning (see Table 5). 
Table 5 Time decision level of reviewed works. 
Authors Strategic Tactical Operational 
(Agnetis et al., 2006)   x 
(Attanasio et al., 2006)   x 
(Dash et al., 2007)  x  
(Dudek et al., 2007)  x  
(Pibernik et al., 2007)  x  
(Pittman et al., 2007)  x  
(Cheng et al., 2008)   x 
(Feng et al., 2008) x x x 
(Jung et al., 2008)   x 
(Kelly et al., 2008)   x 
(Nie et al., 2008)  x  
(Nishi et al., 2008)   x 
(Walther et al., 2008)  x  
(Jeong et al., 2009)   x 
(Pukkala et al., 2009)  x  
(Silva et al., 2009)  x x 
(Frazzon et al., 2010)   x 
(Gaudreault et al., 2010)  x  
(Gunnerud et al., 2010)   x 
(Homberger, 2010)  x  
(Homberger et al., 2010)  x  
(Lee et al., 2010)  x  
(Lehoux et al., 2010a)  x  
(Lehoux et al., 2010b)   x  
(Homberger et al., 2011)  x  
(Homberger, 2011)  x  
(Lau et al., 2011)   x 
(Mouret et al., 2011)   x 
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(Singh et al., 2011)   x 
(Lu et al., 2012) x x  
(Buer et al., 2013)  x  
(Kovács et al., 2013)  x  
(Taghipour et al., 2013)  x  
(Thomas et al., 2013)  x  
(Ziebuhr et al., 2013)  x  
(Behnamian, 2014)  x x 
(Kong et al., 2014) x x  
(Lehoux et al., 2014)  x  
(Reiss et al., 2014)  x  
(Sokoler et al., 2014)   x 
(Thomas et al., 2014)  x x 
(Acar et al., 2015)  x x 
(Albrecht et al., 2015)  x  
(Buer et al., 2015)  x  
(Eslikizi et al., 2015)  x  
(Harb et al., 2015)  x  
(Homberger et al., 2015)  x  
(Mason et al., 2015)  x  
(Qu et al., 2015) x x  
(Thomas et al., 2015)  x x 
(Ziebuhr et al., 2015)  x  
(Agnetis et al., 2016)  x x 
(Bajgiran et al., 2016)  x  
(Jia et al., 2016)  x  
(Singh et al., 2016)  x x 
(Tang et al., 2016b)   x 
(Wenzel et al., 2016a)    x 
(Wenzel et al., 2016b)    x 
(Zoghlami et al., 2016)  x  
 
As can be seen, only four of the studies consider coordination in strategic decisions, in the long term, 
where two of them are related to forest problems and the wood industry (Feng et al., 2008; Kong et al., 
2014) since the periods of optimum forest growth are around 25 years. Lu et al. (2012) pose a localization 
problem, with a mediator-free coordination based on the human immune system. Qu et al. (2015) solve a 
problem of configuring a cluster by means of the augmented Lagrange or updating the Lagrange 
multiplier using the quadratic function. 
 
3.2. Structure and relationship between the members of the SC 
The SC structure is one of the main factors in the complexity of aligning the plans of the different 
organizations in order to achieve coordination (Stadtler, 2007). Such complexity will influence the type of 
information shared, the generation of trust and the quality of shared information. It will be defined the 
structure of the SC (see Table 6) by the number of tiers, members at each level, the business area to be co-
ordinated and whether coordination is between different organizations (inter) or within the same 
organization (intra).  
Table 6 Structure of the organization on reviewed works. 




(Agnetis et al., 2006) 2 1-n Prod Inter 
(Attanasio et al., 2006) 2 n-1 Prod Inter 
(Dash et al., 2007) 2 n-n Prod Inter 
(Dudek et al., 2007) 2 1-n prod Inter 
(Pibernik et al., 2007) 2 n-n prod, distr Inter 
(Pittman et al., 2007) 1 n prod Intra 
(Cheng et al., 2008) 1 n prod Intra 
(Feng et al., 2008) 3 n-n-n prod, distr, sales Intra 
(Jung et al., 2008) 2 1-1 prod, distr Inter 
(Kelly et al., 2008) 2 n-n prod Intra 
(Nie et al., 2008) n n prod Inter 
(Nishi et al., 2008) 2 1-n prod Inter 
(Walther et al., 2008) 2 n-1 prod, distr Inter 
(Jeong et al., 2009) 1 1-1 prod Intra 
(Pukkala et al., 2009) 1 n prod Intra 
(Silva et al., 2009) 2 n-1 prod, distr Inter 
(Frazzon et al., 2010) 2 1-1 prod, distr Inter 
(Gaudreault et al., 2010) 3 1-1-1 prod Intra 
(Gunnerud et al., 2010) 1 n prod Intra 
(Homberger, 2010) n 1-1-1 prod Inter 
(Homberger et al., 2010) n 1-1-1 prod Inter 
(Lee et al., 2010) 2 1-n distr Inter 
(Lehoux et al., 2010a)  2 1-1 prod, distr Inter 
(Lehoux et al., 2010b) 2 1-1 prod, distr Inter 
(Homberger et al., 2011) n 1-1-1 prod Inter 
(Homberger, 2011) n 1-1-1 prod Inter 
(Lau et al., 2011) 1 1-n prod Intra 
(Mouret et al., 2011) 1 1-1 prod Intra 
(Singh et al., 2011) 2 1-n prod Inter 
(Lu et al., 2012) 1 n - - 
(Buer et al., 2013) n 1-1-1 prod Inter 
(Kovács et al., 2013) 2 1-1 prod Inter 
(Taghipour et al., 2013) 2 1-1 prod Inter 
(Thomas et al., 2013) 2 1-n prod, distr Inter 
(Ziebuhr et al., 2013) n 1-1-1 prod Inter 
(Behnamian, 2014) 2 n-1 prod, distr - 
(Kong et al., 2014) 2 1-n prod, distr Intra 
(Lehoux et al., 2014) 2 1-1 prod, distr Inter 
(Reiss et al., 2014) n 1-1-1 prod Inter 
(Sokoler et al., 2014) 1 1-n prod - 
(Thomas et al., 2014) 2 1-n prod, distr Inter 
(Acar et al., 2015) 2 n-n prod, distr Intra 
(Albrecht et al., 2015) 2 n-1 prod - 
(Buer et al., 2015) 2 n-1 prod Inter 
(Eslikizi et al., 2015) 2 n-1 prod Inter 
(Harb et al., 2015) 2 n-1 prod Inter 
(Homberger et al., 2015) n 1-1-1 prod Inter 
(Mason et al., 2015) 2 n-1 prod Inter 
(Qu et al., 2015) 2 n-1 prod Inter 
(Thomas et al., 2015) 2 1-n prod, distr Inter 
(Ziebuhr et al., 2015) 2 n-1 prod Inter 
(Agnetis et al., 2016) 2 1-1 prod, distr Inter 
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(Bajgiran et al., 2016) 3 1-n-n prod, distr Inter 
(Jia et al., 2016) 2 1-1 prod, distr Inter 
(Singh et al., 2016) 2 n-1 prod Inter 
(Tang et al., 2016b) 1 n prod Intra 
(Wenzel et al., 2016a)  2 1-n prod Intra 
(Wenzel et al., 2016b) 2 1-n prod Intra 
(Zoghlami et al., 2016) 2 1-n prod Inter 
n number of members, n-n-n number of members on each tier level, prod production, distr distribution, - unknown  
Of the papers, it can be highlighted the few works of intra-coordination. Therefore, there is an opportunity 
for works on the coordination within complex organizations where centralized solutions are not adequate, 
by their volume of information, maintenance of information or capacity to react on real time to changes. 
Within these works, it can be found several cases of complex petrochemical companies (Gunnerud et al., 
2010; Mouret et al., 2011) or where real-time coordination of distributed control systems is sought 
(Cheng et al., 2008) or in the forest industry (Feng et al., 2008; Gaudreault et al., 2010; Pukkala et al., 
2009). On the other hand, it can be seen in Table 6 the only three studies where the coordination with 
three SC levels (Bajgiran et al., 2016; Feng et al., 2008; Gaudreault et al., 2010) all of them from the 
wood industry (Table 8) . 
The simplest collaboration is that established between two agents 1-1 (Jeong et al., 2009; Jia et al., 2016). 
But if it is wanted to delve deeper it is necessary to consider situations of several agents, 1-n, a supplier 
with several clients, which is a divergent SC (Dudek et al., 2007; Zoghlami et al., 2016) or n-1, several 
providers for a single client, which would be a considered a convergent one (Wenzel et al., 2016a, 
2016b). But also intercompany cases, where there is no customer or supplier, identified as an n, in which 
it is necessary to coordinate among the agents, as in negotiation between workplace tasks for the 
fulfilment of orders as proposed by Ziebuhr et al. (2013), auctions between jobs for production scheduling 
(Tang et al., 2016b). And when several agents have to agree on how to share a common resource without 
the figure of a coordinator or mediator (Lu et al., 2012). Another step in the complexity, which brings us 
closer to the reality of the market, is when coordination must be established in situations n-n, several 
suppliers and clients that by auctions seek to coordinate resources (Dash et al., 2007), the supply chain as 
a network (Acar et al., 2015), in situations of shared SC such as in the clusters (Qu et al., 2015). And 
where manufacturing units must be coordinated with several logistics units (Pibernik et al., 2007). It can 
also be increased the complexity by considering more links in the SC, which is to say not only OEM with 
Tier 1, but also to include Tier 2 or Tier 0.5 or 3PL. 
On the other hand, coordination proposals can refer to production problems, such as those related to the 
assignment of tasks, capacities or batches. But also, it can allude to coordination problems with 
distribution or sales (Feng et al., 2008). But such problems of coordination can also be between different 
business areas, such as production and distribution, such as the cases studied on the coordination of 
productive plants and their distribution service providers, the 3PL (Agnetis et al., 2016; Jia et al., 2016; 
Jung et al., 2008). 
3.3. Type of relationship between members of the SC 
In this section the type of relationship and behaviour of the agents are analysed. The need to generate trust 
to facilitate coordination (Manrodt et al., 2004), or the search for tools that allow to verify that the shared 
information is correct without any opportunism.  
In analysing the power in the relationship, it was found that few works make explicit reference to it, if 
there are imbalances, on which side it is or if it is exerted. Therefore, the table has been completed based 
on the type of mechanism proposed and the ability to resolve discrepancies or left in blank. Power in 
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coordination relationships has an important deterrent effect, in generating trust in collaborative 
relationships (Vitasek, 2016).  
Regarding trust, in most of the works, teamwork behaviour has been assumed (see Table 7) except in the 
case of using auctions as a coordination tool (Dash et al., 2007) that implicitly corrects opportunistic 
behaviour. Although trust behaviours are not so unrealistic (Chen et al. 2004). However, there are few 
studies on the consequences of a possible opportunistic behaviour, although in several of them the need 
arises (Buer et al., 2013; Dash et al., 2007; Dudek et al., 2007; Lehoux et al., 2014; Pittman et al., 2007). 
In addition, when successive negotiations or exchanges of information between members are carried out, 
such non-essential information may allow an estimation of private or critical information, facilitating 
opportunistic positions. There are few studies that analyse or mention the learning of negotiation 
(Albrecht et al., 2015; Dash et al., 2007). Adequate incentives to provide true information on negotiation 
and influencing factors should be further addressed (Wang et al., 2016).  
Another element is the rolling horizons, a common element in the industry to deal with uncertainty 
(Stadtler, 2007). In this process, the existing plan is updated and extended, involving the renegotiation of 
the effects of these changes with the SC members, but in most models it is not considered (Stadtler, 
2007). In our selection of papers, only four studies have presented the rolling horizons (Frazzon et al., 
2010; Lehoux et al., 2010a, 2010b, 2014) as a way of approaching the reality of industry, but without the 
renegotiation of the prejudices of the new plans. 
Table 7 Relationships among SC members of reviewed works. 






(Agnetis et al., 2006) - T    
(Attanasio et al., 2006) - T    
(Dash et al., 2007) - Oppor x x  
(Dudek et al., 2007) S T x   
(Pibernik et al., 2007) - T x   
(Pittman et al., 2007) - T    
(Cheng et al., 2008) - T    
(Feng et al., 2008) - T    
(Jung et al., 2008) B T    
(Kelly et al., 2008) - T    
(Nie et al., 2008) - T    
(Nishi et al., 2008) S T    
(Walther et al., 2008) B T    
(Jeong et al., 2009) - T    
(Pukkala et al., 2009) - T    
(Silva et al., 2009) B T    
(Frazzon et al., 2010) B T   x 
(Gaudreault et al., 2010) - T    
(Gunnerud et al., 2010) - T    
(Homberger, 2010) - T    
(Homberger et al., 2010) - T    
(Lee et al., 2010) S T    
(Lehoux et al., 2010a) B T   x 
(Lehoux et al., 2010b)  B T   x 
(Homberger et al., 2011) - T    
(Homberger, 2011) - T    
(Lau et al., 2011) - T    
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(Mouret et al., 2011) - T    
(Singh et al., 2011) S T    
(Lu et al., 2012) - T    
(Buer et al., 2013) - T x   
(Kovács et al., 2013) B T    
(Taghipour et al., 2013) B T    
(Thomas et al., 2013) S T    
(Ziebuhr et al., 2013) - T    
(Behnamian, 2014) - T    
(Kong et al., 2014) S T    
(Lehoux et al., 2014) B T x  x 
(Reiss et al., 2014) - T    
(Sokoler et al., 2014) - T    
(Thomas et al., 2014) S T    
(Acar et al., 2015) B T    
(Albrecht et al., 2015) B T  x  
(Buer et al., 2015) B T    
(Eslikizi et al., 2015) B T    
(Harb et al., 2015) B T    
(Homberger et al., 2015) - T    
(Mason et al., 2015) B T    
(Qu et al., 2015) B T    
(Thomas et al., 2015) S T    
(Ziebuhr et al., 2015) B T    
(Agnetis et al., 2016) B T    
(Bajgiran et al., 2016) B T    
(Jia et al., 2016) B T    
(Singh et al., 2016) B T    
(Tang et al., 2016b) - T    
(Wenzel et al., 2016a)  S T    
(Wenzel et al., 2016b) S T    
(Zoghlami et al., 2016) B T    
B buyer, S supplier, T team, Oppor opportunism 
3.4. Objectives of coordination mechanism 
In this section it is highlighted the pretensions of the coordination mechanisms (see Table 8). In cases 
where a centralized coordination with all the information is feasible, it will be able to find a better 
solution to planning problems (Pibernik et al., 2007), even more so in cases of uncertainty (Acar et al., 
2015). However, coordination mechanisms may simply seek to improve against non-coordination. For 
example, hierarchical coordination mechanisms without compensations or renegotiations, both upstream 
and downstream, achieve better alignment of flows (material) in the SC and improve against non-
coordination (Agnetis et al., 2016), “alignment” in Table 8. On the other hand, other mechanisms seek to 
get closer to the optimal global results, knowing that it may incur worse local results of some of its 
members that must compensate with compensations or discounts (Eslikizi et al., 2015), “near opt.” in 
Table 8. It is found that 49% of the included paper tries to find an optimal solution, even when a culture 
of team behaviour is not necessarily common in the industry, and is required in almost all mechanism. In 
other cases, it simply seeks a rightful solution that does not necessarily seek the global optimum but a fair 
distribution (Lehoux et al., 2010a), “fair” in Table 8. Different definitions of the term "fair" can be found 
in Stadtler (2007) or Katok & Pavlov (2013). 
Table 8 Required solution, results and sector of reviewed works. 







(Agnetis et al., 2006) alignment proof - 
(Attanasio et al., 2006) near opt. computer Computational grid 
(Dash et al., 2007) near opt. computer - 
(Dudek et al., 2007) fair computer - 
(Pibernik et al., 2007) fair computer - 
(Pittman et al., 2007) near opt. simulation Wood industry 
(Cheng et al., 2008) near opt. simulation Chemical industry 
(Feng et al., 2008) alignment simulation Wood industry 
(Jung et al., 2008) alignment computer 3PL 
(Kelly et al., 2008) alignment simulation Chemical industry 
(Nie et al., 2008) near opt. computer - 
(Nishi et al., 2008) near opt. simulation Chemical industry 
(Walther et al., 2008) near opt. simulation Recycling industry 
(Jeong et al., 2009) near opt. computer - 
(Pukkala et al., 2009) near opt. simulation Wood industry 
(Silva et al., 2009) alignment simulation - 
(Frazzon et al., 2010) alignment simulation 3PL 
(Gaudreault et al., 2010) alignment simulation Wood industry 
(Gunnerud et al., 2010) near opt. simulation Chemical industry 
(Homberger, 2010) fair computer * 
(Homberger et al., 2010) fair computer * 
(Lee et al., 2010) near opt. computer - 
(Lehoux et al., 2010a) fair simulation Wood industry 
(Lehoux et al., 2010b) fair simulation Wood industry 
(Homberger et al., 2011) fair computer * 
(Homberger, 2011) fair computer * 
(Lau et al., 2011) near opt. simulation Container Terminal Operations 
(Mouret et al., 2011) near opt. simulation Chemical industry 
(Singh et al., 2011) near opt. computer Mining industry 
(Lu et al., 2012) near opt. computer, proof - 
(Buer et al., 2013) fair computer * 
(Kovács et al., 2013) fair computer - 
(Taghipour et al., 2013) fair computer - 
(Thomas et al., 2013) near opt. computer Mining industry 
(Ziebuhr et al., 2013) fair computer * 
(Behnamian, 2014) near opt. computer - 
(Kong et al., 2014) near opt. simulation Wood industry 
(Lehoux et al., 2014) fair simulation Wood industry 
(Reiss et al., 2014) alignment computer * 
(Sokoler et al., 2014) near opt. simulation Energy industry 
(Thomas et al., 2014) near opt. computer Mining industry 
(Acar et al., 2015) alignment simulation Chemical industry 
(Albrecht et al., 2015) near opt. proof - 
(Buer et al., 2015) fair computer * 
(Eslikizi et al., 2015) fair computer * 
(Harb et al., 2015) near opt. simulation Heating industry 
(Homberger et al., 2015) fair computer * 
(Mason et al., 2015) near opt. simulation Farm industry 
(Qu et al., 2015) near opt. simulation - 
(Thomas et al., 2015) near opt. computer Mining industry 
(Ziebuhr et al., 2015) fair computer * 
(Agnetis et al., 2016) fair computer 3PL 
(Bajgiran et al., 2016) near opt. simulation Wood industry 
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(Jia et al., 2016) fair computer 3PL 
(Singh et al., 2016) near opt. computer - 
(Tang et al., 2016b) fair computer - 
(Wenzel et al., 2016a) near opt. simulation Chemical industry 
(Wenzel et al., 2016b) near opt. simulation Chemical industry 
(Zoghlami et al., 2016) fair computer - 
near opt. optimal, - not defined, simulation test done with a real case, computer test done by a test bed, proof the convergence of the 
coordination mechanism is given, * bill of material is known by all agents (i.e. automotive) 
3.5. Models in collaboration 
In this section, it is tried to analyse the modelling approach used (see Table 9). Most use linear 
programming modelling approach with binary or integer elements (MILP Mixed Integer Linear 
Programming), except four which are linear (LP) programming. On the other hand, four apply quadratic 
programming (QP). Finally, quasi-linear to be able to apply the mechanisms of Vickrey–Clarke–Groves 
(VCG) (Dash et al., 2007).  
The phase in which co-ordination arises is in most cases in its planning phase, when assigning orders or 
loads or lots to agents. Only in four, it is in the design phase, when determining interlocutors and 
capacities. The remainder are in the execution phase, when sequencing is set and loads were already 
assigned. On the other hand, it has not been found that it is used in the evaluation phase of past situations 
that could serve for future negotiations, as Stadtler (2007) said.  
Regarding which information is hidden and which is shared, it is necessary to emphasize that it is usual to 
hide the local costs, since each agent is allowed to make its own calculations locally and only the internal 
price is shared by the shared resource, with the use of this resource or the acceptance of different planning 
proposals. It is important to emphasize the need for a security protocol to share only the aggregate of the 
use of shared capacity, leaving behind in that protocol the detailed use of resources (Singh et al., 2016). 











(Agnetis et al., 2006) MILP Execution local costs schedule, buffer capacity, 
storage cost 
MC MC 
(Attanasio et al., 2006) MILP Execution local capacity resource dual value  MCman MCman 
(Dash et al., 2007) auction / 
Quasi-linear 
Planning local costs Quantity, price MRA MP 
(Dudek et al., 2007) MILP  Planning local costs differential cost form their 
optimal value 
MC MC 
(Pibernik et al., 2007) MILP  Planning local costs demand MC MC 
(Pittman et al., 2007) MILP  Planning local harvest 
restriction 
internal price MNPV MNPV 
(Cheng et al., 2008) LP Execution local chemical 
parameters 
internal price for shared 
steam 
MC MC 
(Feng et al., 2008) MILP  Planning local cost sales, lot size MP MC 
(Jung et al., 2008) LP Execution local costs preferred plan MC MC 
(Kelly et al., 2008) MILP Execution local 
restriction 
resource, regulation, 
register, offers and 
obstacles-offsets-outages 
MC MC 
(Nie et al., 2008) MILP  Planning local costs internal price MC MC 
(Nishi et al., 2008) MILP Planning local costs internal price MC MC 
(Walther et al., 2008) MILP  Planning local costs internal price MP MP 
(Jeong et al., 2009) MILP Execution processing 
time and 
routings on 
machine use  MTCi MTCi 
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(Pukkala et al., 2009) MILP  Planning local grow 
conditions 
internal price MFG MFG 
(Silva et al., 2009) MILP Execution local costs pheromone matrix MC MC 
(Frazzon et al., 2010) MILP Execution local cost provision date of orders, 
demand 
MC MC 
(Gaudreault et al., 
2010) 
MILP  Planning local costs demand MC MC 
(Gunnerud et al., 2010) MILP Execution local costs internal price MC MC 
(Homberger, 2010) MILP Planning local costs proposed contracts and 
agents votes 
MV MC 
(Homberger et al., 
2010) 
MILP  Planning local costs proposed contracts and 
agents votes 
MV MC 




(Lehoux et al., 2010a) MILP  Planning local costs orders MP MP 
(Lehoux et al., 2010b)  MILP  Planning local costs orders/inventory cost MP MP 
(Homberger et al., 
2011) 
MILP  Planning local costs proposed contracts and 
agents votes 
MV MC 
(Homberger, 2011) MILP  Planning local costs proposed contracts and 
agents votes 
MV MC 
(Lau et al., 2011) MILP Execution local capacity internal price MCman MCman 
(Mouret et al., 2011) MILP Execution local costs internal price MP MP 
(Singh et al., 2011) MILP Execution local 
requirements 
internal price MTWT MTWT 
(Lu et al., 2012) LP  Planning local costs use of common resources 
and internal prices 
MP MP 
(Buer et al., 2013) MILP  Planning local costs proposed contracts and 
agents votes 
MV MC 
(Kovács et al., 2013) MILP  Planning local costs proposal contract interest 
and financial incentives,  
MP MP 
(Taghipour et al., 2013) MILP  Planning local costs proposal contract interest 
and financial incentives,  
MP MP 
(Thomas et al., 2013) MILP  Planning local costs internal price MC MC 
(Ziebuhr et al., 2013) MILP Planning local costs proposed contracts and 
agents votes 
MV MC 
(Behnamian, 2014) MILP  Planning local capacity feasibility MC Due date 
(Kong et al., 2014) MILP Planning local costs internal price MP MP 
(Lehoux et al., 2014) MILP  Planning local costs demand MP MP 
(Reiss et al., 2014) MILP Planning local costs proposed contracts and 
agents variation of the local 
production cost 
MC MC 
(Sokoler et al., 2014) LP - QP  Planning local costs internal price MC MC 
(Thomas et al., 2014) MILP  Planning local costs internal price MC MTWT 
(Acar et al., 2015) MILP  Planning local plan demand, cost, capacity MC MC 
(Albrecht et al., 2015) LP  Planning local costs assignments and cost 
differential 
MP MP 
(Buer et al., 2015) MILP Design/Plann
ing 
local set up 
and inventory 
holding 
proposed contracts, agents 
votes, local total cost and 
savings 
MV MC 
(Eslikizi et al., 2015) MILP Design/Plann
ing 
local set up 
and inventory 
holding 
proposed contracts, agents 
votes, local total cost and 
savings 
MV MC 
(Harb et al., 2015) MILP  Planning local costs internal price MC MC 
(Homberger et al., 
2015) 
MILP  Planning local costs proposed contracts, agent 
voting and agents variation 
of the local production cost 
MV MC 
(Mason et al., 2015) MILP  Planning local costs internal price MP MP 




(Thomas et al., 2015) MILP  Planning local costs internal price and resource 
availability or production 
capacity 
MC MC 
(Ziebuhr et al., 2015) MILP Design/Plann
ing 
local costs proposed contracts, agents 
votes 
MV MC 
(Agnetis et al., 2016) MILP Execution local cost, 
capacities 




(Bajgiran et al., 2016) MILP  Planning local costs internal price MP MC 
(Jia et al., 2016) MILP  Planning local cost, 
capacities 
 planning proposed and 
compensation 
MP MP 
(Singh et al., 2016) MILP Planning local costs internal price MC MC 
(Tang et al., 2016b) MILP Execution capacities internal price MCman MCman 
(Wenzel et al., 2016a)  QP  Planning local costs internal price MC MC 
(Wenzel et al., 2016b) QP  Planning local costs internal price MC MC 
(Zoghlami et al., 2016) MILP  Planning local costs proposed contract interest 
and discount incentives 
MP MP 
MILP Mixed Integer Linear Programming, LP Linear Programming, QP Quadratic Programming, MC Minimize cost, MCman Minimize 
makespan, MRA Maximize resource allocation, MP Maximize profit, MTCi Minimize total completion time, MFG Maximize forest 
grow, MV Maximize voting, MNPV Maximize net present value of income, MTWT Minimize total weighted tardiness 
3.6. Characteristics of the implementation of the mechanism  
In this section, it is analysed the coordination mechanisms used. Of these, it can be highlighted that 20 
works have used the Lagrange multiplier (Table 10). It has been considered separately the DW method 
and Benders although they are an extension of the Lagrange multiplier.  
From the work with the Lagrangian multiplier it can be seen that the heuristic of the subgradient (Fisher, 
1985; Held et al., 1970, 1971) is used to update the multiplier in seven of the works (Attanasio et al., 
2006; Jeong et al., 2009; Kong et al., 2014; Lau et al., 2011; Lu et al., 2012; Pukkala et al., 2009; Walther 
et al., 2008). As Fisher (2004) comments, the method does not meet the convergence requirement, that the 
sum of gradients tends to infinity, but it works empirically. But the subgradient method tends to oscillate 
in its outcome (Singh et al., 2011) and its convergence speed (Nie et al., 2008) especially when the size of 
the passage is small (Thomas et al., 2013). The multiplier has also been updated, using the Augmented 
Lagrangian method, a quadratic function to update the multiplier (Table 10). This quadratic function can 
be linearized to maintain the linear modelling approach (Nishi et al., 2008) or to maintain a nonlinear 
modelling approach (Qu et al., 2015) or work with a quadratic function (Lee et al., 2010; Wenzel et al., 
2016a, 2016b). Another method of updating the multiplier is by Volume Algorithm (Singh et al., 2011, 
2016) and its combination with Wedelin Algorithms (Thomas et al., 2015, 2013). Other alternatives are 
the mixture of cutting plans, subgradient and boxstep applied by Mouret et al. (2011). Also in combining 
it with meta-heuristics such as Genetic Algorithm (Nie et al., 2008) or immunological system (Lu et al., 
2012) or specific problem heuristics (Bajgiran et al., 2016). Another line is the update of the Lagrange 
multiplier by Column Generation (Sokoler et al., 2014) or stabilized by weighted elements proposed by 
Thomas et al. (2014). 
Another tool used is the Lagrange decomposition by the Dantzig-Wolfe method (1960) that it is found in 
seven works (Table 10). In this work, the internal price of the use of the shared resource or shadow price 
is updated by the centralized mediator (Harb et al., 2015; Mason et al., 2015), who seeks to meet relaxed 
restrictions by adjusting the price, by raising resource prices when agents request more resources. This 
method tends to the optimal solution of the system as the Lagrange multiplier update in linear modelling 
approach by the subgradient (Polyak 1969). 
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Equivalent is the method proposed by the decomposition of Benders (1962). Benders proposes to dualize 
the function and then relax the constraints to generate separable sub-problems or agents, where a 
centralized problem must add the optima of each sub-problem with constraints and functions that cannot 
be decomposed. The Bender method will request the prices proposed by the agents to reduce or increase 
the shares (Behnamian, 2014). 
Another alternative of a coordinating mechanism has been meta-heuristics, such as ant colony or 
pheromone (Silva et al., 2009) or Simulated Annealing (Buer et al., 2015; Dudek et al., 2007; Eslikizi et 
al., 2015; Ziebuhr et al., 2013, 2015) or variable neighbourhood search (Reiss et al., 2014) that allow to 
seek a better coordination according to pre-established rules but without guarantees of being optimal. 
Other works have sought that the agents vote or bid for the best combination according to their local 
interests. By extending Vickrey–Clarke–Groves (VCG) to a Continuous Double Auction (CDA) so that 
agents are encouraged to honestly report their capabilities and costs for potential penalties (Dash et al., 
2007). In other cases, with a finite solutions modelling approach (Distributed Multi-Level Uncapacitated 
Lot-Sizing Problem)(DMLULSP) they are voted and applied meta-heuristic neighbourhood search 
(Homberger et al., 2015) to find a better solution. These votes have also been evaluated by rules Borda 
maximum voting rule along with meta-heuristics ant colony or pheromone (Homberger et al., 2011, 2010) 
or evolutionary algorithms (Homberger, 2011), or with other voting rules Metropolis acceptance criterion 
and the meta-heuristic simulated annealing (Homberger, 2010) or with different rules Rawls or min-max 
voting rule and the meta-heuristic ant colony or pheromone (Buer et al., 2013). Also auctions using 
modelling approach of nonlinear mathematical programming (Tang et al., 2016b). Another example is a 
combinatorial auction of the machine allocation problem that adjusts the allocation price with the 
subgradient method (Lau et al., 2011). 
In addition, there are hierarchical mechanisms, where the needs are reported. This simple method gives 
better results than disinformation or non-coordination, where suppliers must make forecasts of demand 
according to historical or other data. The hierarchical coordination mechanism can be initiated by 
propositions without downstream negotiations (Acar et al., 2015), upstream (Agnetis et al., 2006; Frazzon 
et al., 2010), with counter-proposals (Gaudreault et al., 2010), with negotiations (Kelly et al., 2008) and 
with compensations (Taghipour et al., 2013). Although the effects of local decisions of all partners are not 
taken into account, suboptimal plans can be produced in comparison to centralized coordination 
(Bhatnagar et al., 1993). Dudek (2005) compared upstream planning with centralized planning, observing 
average differences of 14.1% in total SC costs. 
Finally, other methods of coordination have been compared, such as the CFPR® (collaborative planning, 
forecasting and replenishment) (VICS, 2004) proposals, assimilating it to a forecast of shared demand, or 
VMI (Vendor Management Inventory), or RR (regular replenishment) (Lehoux et al., 2010b). 
On the other hand, it is necessary to emphasize that, if it is wanted to achieve the compensation of the 
local optimum among the agents and reach better global solutions close to the centralized optimal 
solution, it is necessary to contemplate the compensations or the discounts between agents. It can be 
identified the twelve jobs with side-payments in Table 10. 
Lastly, several works have proposed coordination mechanism without the need for a mediator. Of which 
it can be highlighted three, that without the figure of a mediator, try to reach results close to the global 
optimums (Albrecht et al., 2015; Lee et al., 2010; Lu et al., 2012), although they lack its application in 
real cases. The others are hierarchical processes and in some cases compensations are made that allow 
fairer results (Jia et al., 2016; Kovács et al., 2013; Lehoux et al., 2010a, 2014; Pibernik et al., 2007; Silva 
et al., 2009; Taghipour et al., 2013; Zoghlami et al., 2016) 
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Table 10 Coordination mechanism of reviewed works 
Authors  Mechanism Mediator 
Initial 
solution 







(Agnetis et al., 2006) HBP Hierarchical, no negotiation  D 1  - 
(Attanasio et al., 2006) AN Auction, Lagrangian-based decomposition x D big  IN or MG 
(Dash et al., 2007) AM Continuous Double Auction  D big  DA 
(Dudek et al., 2007) MH Shared cost increase and Simulated 
Annealing  
 U small x SA 
(Pibernik et al., 2007) HBP Partially centralized with a hierarchical 
without negotiation 
 U 1 x - 
(Pittman et al., 2007) DW Dantzig–Wolfe decomposition x L big  IN or MG 
(Cheng et al., 2008) DW Dantzig–Wolfe decomposition x L big  IN or MG 
(Feng et al., 2008) HBP Hierarchical, no negotiation  D 1  - 
(Jung et al., 2008) HBP Hierarchical, negotiation  D small  DA 
(Kelly et al., 2008) HBP Hierarchical, weight adjustment  D small  CT 
(Nie et al., 2008) LR Lagrangian relaxation and multiplier 
update with Genetic Algorithms 
x D big  IN or MG 
(Nishi et al., 2008) LR Augmented Lagrangian linearized x L big  IN or MG 
(Walther et al., 2008) LR Lagrangian relaxation and multiplier 
update with a linear function 
x U big  IN or MG 
(Jeong et al., 2009) LR Lagrangian relaxation and multiplier 
update with modified subgradient 
x L big  IN or MG 
(Pukkala et al., 2009) LR Lagrangian relaxation, subgradient x L big  IN  
(Silva et al., 2009) MH Pheromone matrix  D small  IN  
(Frazzon et al., 2010) HBP Hierarchical, no negotiation  U 1  - 
(Gaudreault et al., 
2010) 
HBP Hierarchical, negotiation  B 2  - 
(Gunnerud et al., 2010) DW/
LR 
DW, Lagrangian decomposition x L small  MG 
(Homberger, 2010) MH Metropolis acceptance criterion and 
Simulated annealing method 
x R big  SA 
(Homberger et al., 
2010) 
MH Borda maxmin voting rule and 
Pheromone matrix 
x R big  IN 
(Lee et al., 2010) LR Augmented Lagrangian with Alternating 
Direction Method and Diagonal Quadratic 
Approximation Method  
x L big  IN 
(Lehoux et al., 2010a) HBP Hierarchical, no negotiation  D 1 x - 
(Lehoux et al., 2010b)  HBP Vendor Managed Inventory  D 1  - 
(Homberger et al., 
2011) 
MH Borda maxmin voting rule and 
Pheromone matrix 
x R big  IN 
(Homberger, 2011) MH Borda maxmin voting rule and 
Evolutionary Algorithms  
x R big  IN 
(Lau et al., 2011) AM Combinatorial auction – Lagrangian 
relaxation 
x U small  IN 
(Mouret et al., 2011) LR Lagrangian decomposition, multiplier is 
updated with cutting planes, subgradient, 
and boxstep 
x D small  IN or MG 
(Singh et al., 2011) LR Lagrangian relaxation, multiplier is 
updated with Volume Algorithm 
x D big  IN or MG 
(Lu et al., 2012) LR Lagrangian relaxation and immunity-
inspired coordination (LR-ICI) 
 L big  IN or MG 
(Buer et al., 2013) MH Modification of Borda maxmin voting 
rule and Pheromone matrix 
x R big  IN 
(Kovács et al., 2013) HBP Hierarchical, shared benefits  D small x 2º 
(Taghipour et al., 2013) HBP Hierarchical, shared discount   D small x 2º 
(Thomas et al., 2013) LR Lagrangian relaxation, with Volume and 
Wedelin Algorithms. 
x U big  CTor MG 
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(Ziebuhr et al., 2013) MH Metropolis acceptance criterion and 
Simulated annealing method extended by 
a part-way reset procedure 
x R big  SA 
(Behnamian, 2014) B Benders decomposition x D big  CT or 
feasible 
(Kong et al., 2014) LR Lagrangian decomposition, subgradient x D big  CT or MG 
(Lehoux et al., 2014) HBP Hierarchical, shared benefits  D 1 x - 
(Reiss et al., 2014) MH Increases of the local production cost and 
variable neighbourhood search 
x R big  CT 
(Sokoler et al., 2014) DW  Dantzig-Wolfe decomposition x L big  CT or MG 
(Thomas et al., 2014) DW Column Generation, internal price 
stabilisation with multiple columns stored 
x U big  CT 
(Acar et al., 2015) HBP Hierarchical, no negotiation  D 1  - 
(Albrecht et al., 2015) DW  Dantzig-Wolfe modification  D small x MG 
(Buer et al., 2015) MH Metropolis acceptance criterion, 
Simulated annealing method extended by 
a part-way reset procedure and side-
payments 
x R big x SA 
(Eslikizi et al., 2015) MH Metropolis acceptance criterion, 
Simulated annealing method extended by 
a part-way reset procedure and side-
payments 
x R big x SA 
(Harb et al., 2015) DW  Dantzig-Wolfe decomposition x D big  CT or MG 
or IN 
(Homberger et al., 
2015) 
MH Voting-based solution acceptance criteria, 
Neighbourhood search, and side-payments 
to avoid local solutions 
x R big x IN 
(Mason et al., 2015) DW  Dantzig-Wolfe decomposition x U small  IN or MG 
(Qu et al., 2015) LR Augmented Lagrangian  x U big  IN or MG 
(Thomas et al., 2015) LR Lagrangian relaxation, Volume and 
Wedelin Algorithms. Secure-sum for 
lower bound update 
 U big  CTor MG or 
IN 
(Ziebuhr et al., 2015) MH Simulated annealing extended by a part-
way reset procedure 
x R big  SA 
(Agnetis et al., 2016) HBP Hierarchical, no negotiation, fair schedule 
using the weighted Tchebycheff norm  
 U/ D 2  - 
(Bajgiran et al., 2016) LR Lagrangian relaxation with subgradient 
and heuristics to ensure a feasible solution 
in the primal problem 
x U big  IN 
(Jia et al., 2016) HBP Hierarchical, convergence of planning 
counter proposals with a penalty function 
on each iteration 
 U small x IN 
(Singh et al., 2016) LR Lagrangian relaxation, subgradient, 
Secure-sum Protocol and a primal 
heuristic 
x U big  CTor MG 
(Tang et al., 2016b) AM Auction x L big  IN 
(Wenzel et al., 2016a)  LR Lagrangian decomposition, subgradient, 
Recursive Quadratic Approximation 
x D small  CTor MG 
(Wenzel et al., 2016b) LR Lagrangian decomposition, subgradient, 
Recursive Quadratic Approximation 
x D big  CTor MG 
(Zoghlami et al., 2016) HBP Shared discount from supplier to an 
alternative planning 
 D small x IN 
Benders decomposition approach from Benders (1962), AM action mechanism, DW as the Dantzig-Wolf (1960), HBP Hierarchy bases 
protocol, MH meta-heuristics LR Lagrangian relaxation, D downstream, U upstream, L local, B bottleneck, R random mediator plan 
small defined ≤ 30, IN iteration number, MG minimum gap, DA demand allocated, SA simulated annealing settings, CT computer time. 
3.7. Solutions quality and novelty 
In this section, it will be collected the way in which the works evaluate the proposed solutions and 
novelties. It can be seen in Table 8 that in three cases a demonstration of the convergence of the proposed 
19 
 
mechanism is made. In 24 of the works, a simulation is made from real cases. In the rest, a series of 
computational tests are carried out to verify the adequacy of the coordination mechanism used. Therefore, 
it is necessary to highlight the need to verify the convergence of the proposals for the coordination 
mechanism. In addition, to extend the behaviour analysis of the coordination mechanisms to other 
situations different from the simulation conditions of the specific case of a company, environment or 
sector, as computational tests provide some insights into the quality of solutions (Stadtler, 2007). 
Regarding the novelties and drawbacks of the analysed works, these have been grouped according to the 
type of problem posed. Table 11 shows the works related to production scheduling. In these works, 
different problems of assigning tasks to different machines, in some cases with different locations, are 
presented. However, in none of them are dependencies or product structures. 
Table 11 Value added novelties and comments on reviewed works in production scheduling. 
Authors Value added/ comments 
(Agnetis et al., 2006) 
Scheduling algorithms based on the buyers' schedule proposals, the buffer capacity and the buffer cost. Overall 
system cost is reduced only when the intermediate buffer cost is provided. 
(Attanasio et al., 2006) 
Equivalent results obtained by an auction mechanism based on a progressive Lagrangian heuristic to those provided 
by a centralized Max-Min heuristics. 
(Jeong et al., 2009) 
Minimise total completion time on shared machines while maintaining as much autonomy of sub-production 
systems as possible. Lagrangian multiplier is update with a modification of de Subgradient method, only with local 
information. 
(Frazzon et al., 2010) 
They analyse from a practical test case of production and transport programming that the hierarchical coordination 
without negotiation worsens up to a maximum of 12% with respect to the solution calculated by means of a 
centralized system. 
(Lau et al., 2011) 
An adaptive price adjustment procedure for Lagrangian relaxation show better convergence properties that the 
conventional subgradient price adjustment. 
(Singh et al., 2011) 
Lagrange relaxation solution approaches which incorporates in each iteration the direction of movement as a 
convex combination of the current and previous subgradients. 
(Thomas et al., 2013) 
Even though the resource constraint is relaxed, a new disaggregated version of the constraint is added in the relaxed 
formulation for each individual. Therefore, ensures that the solutions found by individual will be feasible with 
respect to the resource constraint. 
(Behnamian, 2014) Applied a Benders-Decomposition approach for a multi-factory scheduling. 
(Thomas et al., 2014) 
Computational experiments show that the Column Generation outperforms Lagrangian Relaxation, but the major 
drawbacks are it has slow convergence and the high oscillation of dual prices. 
(Thomas et al., 2015) 
It proposes different algorithms to avoid the figure of the mediator and verify the impact of the exchange of 
information. It is found that resource availability information has greater impact than production capacity 
information. 
(Agnetis et al., 2016) 
Presents a fairness schedule between a downstream and an upstream planning proposal using the weighted 
Tchebycheff norm, which coincides with the egalitarian solution, that is, the solution maximizing the minimum 
payoff among the players. 
(Singh et al., 2016) 
A Secure method, on the Subgradient method, is used to exchange player information in order to update the 
gradient with the aggregate information of all users. A heuristics is used to unsure a solution to the primal function 
with the dual proposals. 
(Tang et al., 2016a) 
Each production cell can act as an auctioneer or a bidder with bids for time slots on machines in other cells to 
process its own parts.  
Source: Own elaboration. 
In other papers, they have sought to coordinate different units or entities that have a restriction or a single 
shared resource that relates them to each other, Table12. These works focus on the restriction that relates 
them and not on the operations of each entity or their operations structure.  
Table 12 Value added novelties and comments on reviewed works in a single coordinated restriction. 
Authors Value added/ comments 
(Pittman et al., 2007) 
The Dantzig–Wolfe decomposition or column generation as mechanism to coordinate local management in forest 
industry, with simulated cases from real data, reduced computational times from a centralized problem. 
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(Cheng et al., 2008) 
Autonomous Model Predictive Control coordinated by Dantzig-Wolfe decomposition for chemical plants, with 
equivalent results to a centralized model. 
(Kelly et al., 2008) 
Proposes a standardized nomenclature to describe the communication, coordination and cooperation between two 
hierarchical layers of a decomposed problem. 
(Pukkala et al., 2009) 
A method for forest planning with the positive and negative value for the Lagrangian relaxation with Subgradient 
method. 
(Gunnerud et al., 2010) 
They present, from a case study, a comparison between the Lagrange decomposition, an extension of the Dantzig-
Wolfe decomposition that linearizes the problem (linear constraints and continuous variables) and the centralized 
model. In the most complex problems, the two decomposition methods achieve solutions with gaps lower than 
0.5% in less calculation time than the centralized model. 
(Lee et al., 2010) 
The augmented lagrangean relaxation is updated with two procedures, ones requiring a coordinator and other 
requiring a hierarchical communication between agents 
(Mouret et al., 2011) 
The multiplier update step of the Lagragian relaxation is performed by combining the cutting planes, boxstep and 
subgradient, it does not require defining heuristic updates of parameters during iterations. 
(Lu et al., 2012) 
Presents a distributed algorithm where subsystems solve their sub-problems through local optimization, exchange 
partial information (depends on specific problem domains) with only neighbouring subsystems, and then self-
coordinate their sub-problems by computing Lagrangian multipliers locally with renewed information received by 
communicating with its neighbours, a synchronous iterative distributed decision-making process inspirited on the 
human immune system. 
(Kovács et al., 2013) 
The supplier may abuse the mechanism, by deliberately generate a baseline plan that is unacceptable to the buyer, 
and assign massive compensation costs to any other alternatives. 
(Sokoler et al., 2014) 
Presented a warm-started Dantzig–Wolfe decomposition algorithm for regularized linear Model Predictive Control 
of dynamically decoupled subsystems. In addition, by simulation show that performs faster than CPLEX®, Gurobi® 
and MOSEK® and it is able to handle much larger problems than the general purpose solvers. 
(Harb et al., 2015) 
Centralized model has better results but when the number of agents is increased, it is more appropriate the 
decentralized, although it maintains a centralized control (Dantzig-Wolfe decomposition) but does not overload by 
increasing with new agents. 
(Qu et al., 2015) 
An augmented Lagrange applied to a cluster supply chain resource and service selection, with the inexact inner 
loop method and block coordinate descent algorithm. 
(Wenzel et al., 2016a)  
It presents a quadratic approximation technique for the updating of internal price that shows an improved rate of 
convergence compared to the subgradient-based method. It starts with subgradient method to collect solutions point 
in order to create the Quadratic function to update the internal price. 
(Wenzel et al., 2016) 
It presents an update of the internal price by the Subgradient method initially and then by its results extrapolates a 
quadratic regression of the relaxed restriction since they are vertices of solution of the dual main function; 
therefore, its minimum allows finding the new internal price. 
Source: Own elaboration. 
Table 13 and Table 14 show the novelties of the analysed works that deal with mathematical 
programming for operation planning but none has used an alternative representation to Gozinto. Table 13 
shows the work with models for operations planning with situations of capacity limitation, multi-product 
(except for the work of Dash et al. (2007)) but that do not establish the limitation that all entities know the 
structures of all products as in Table 14. 
Table 13 Value added novelties and comments on reviewed works in operation planning coordination. 
Authors Value added/ comments 
(Dash et al., 2007) 
Continuously allocated demand without the need for a centralized information agent, and when the number of 
participants is greater, the convergence is closer to the optimum. 
(Dudek et al., 2007) 
Single supplier and several buyer negotiations with reduced information exchanged. Supplier savings and buyers’ 
compensation are left to contract terms. The mechanism is near to optimal solution, 6.2% gap and looks for a fair 
distribution. 
(Pibernik et al., 2007) 
Partial centralized and upstream planning in order to improve a downstream planning domain. It generates only a 
locally optimal master plan without considering the consequences for the upstream domains. 
(Feng et al., 2008) 
Compare different ways to perform the hierarchical coordination between centralizing sales and operations by 
decentralizing procurement and distribution with centralizing sales with respect to the available capacity and 
decentralizing production, distribution and procurement in each centre, recommending the latter on a sensitive 
analysis. 
(Jung et al., 2008) 
This paper provides a decentralized supply chain planning framework for the 3PL partnership by focusing on the 
operational side of supply chain planning efficiency from a decentralized perspective. 
(Nie et al., 2008) 
Presents a combining of Lagrangian Relaxation method and Genetic Algorithms for collaborative planning and 
from simulation results showed an average deviation from the central optimal of 1.47%. 
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(Nishi et al., 2008) 
The quadratic penalty term of the augmented Lagrangian is replaced by a linear penalty term. The optimality gap 
between the decentralized solution and an optimal central solution is within 3% for their cases.  
(Walther et al., 2008) 
Update the LR multiplier by a linear function inversely proportional to the iterations, with only local data and 
different step size. The internal prices obtained from the simulation approximate the real prices to coordinate the 
activities. 
(Silva et al., 2009) 
The exchange of information between ants of the same colony (pheromone matrix) can be extended to ants of 
different colonies (suppliers) in order to coordinate them. 
(Gaudreault et al., 
2010) 
The external customer demand is transmitted directly to the bottleneck instead of going through the downstream or 
upstream agent, to propose the initial planning. 
(Lehoux et al., 2010a) 
A hierarchical downstream coordination’s is improved by the share of the transport savings, letting results closer to 
a central coordination as Collaborative Planning, Forecasting and Replenishment proposal. 
(Lehoux et al., 2010b)  
With the Vendor Managed Inventory mode, the producer is responsible for the inventory of its partner and has to 
maintain enough stock at the retailer site to guarantee a high service level, it lets to improve the transport cost. 
CPFR (Collaborative Planning, Forecasting and Replenishment) generates the greatest profit for the producer while 
the regular replenishment mode is the most profitable strategy for the retailer. A shared profit is analysed in order to 
encourage partners to join a CPFR. 
(Taghipour et al., 2013) Presents an improved upstream plan negotiation with a discount plan by a computational analysis. 
(Kong et al., 2014) 
Setting the internal prices with Subgradient, in forest industry, can give the manager understanding of the values of 
logs in different areas and times, therefore a coordination tool. 
(Lehoux et al., 2014) 
The benefits obtained from a better synchronisation of the activities were not necessarily fairly distributed. In 
addition, that partners had difficulties to evaluate the fixed costs associated with the implementation of 
collaborations as well the savings that could be generated from a better coordination. 
(Acar et al., 2015) 
Conclude that the higher the level of demand uncertainty, the greater the benefits of integration and propose central 
planning for tactical and locally for scheduling. 
(Albrecht et al., 2015) 
Propose an approach to handle a multi-period S&OP model as long as it is a Linear Programing with no dual 
information required as in Dantzig-Wolfe decomposition.  
(Mason et al., 2015) 
A decentralized coordination on fresh product with the Dantzig-Wolfe decomposition. However, this formulation 
may not be as attractive for farmers due to its reduced transparency, the perceived lack of control by farmers who 
allow the auctioneer to define the final allocation, and where the market clearing prices are not clearly determined. 
(Bajgiran et al., 2016) 
It implements an algorithm to overcome the usual problem of the subgradient method that the solution proposed in 
the dual is not valid in the primal. It also concludes that if the decoupling points are increased, the results 
deteriorate with respect to a centralized solution. 
(Jia et al., 2016) 
Through the generation of two different plans, that is, the best profit and the best service plans, the transport 
operator evaluates whether his own profit should be increased by proposing a pick-up plan distinct from the 
delivery plan requested by the manufacturer. The 3PL shares his benefits with the manufacturer and adds a penalty 
function to ensure convergence to a joint plan. 
(Zoghlami et al., 2016) 
It presents coordination between a downstream plan and the upstream plan with a discount plan weighted by the 
variation requested from each client. 
Source: Own elaboration. 
Table 14 includes a group of contributions based on the limitation that all the members of the Supply 
Chain know the bill of material. This limitation usually occurs in the automotive industry where the 
structure of the product is known throughout the suppliers. These works also stand out for their 
uncapacitated models except one (Reiss et al., 2014). However, all of them have limited possible 
alternative solutions that have to be evaluated. Among them, it should be highlight the additions of 
different weighting systems of fair voting by the Borda maximin or Shapley or Rawls's criterion. 
Table 14 Value added novelties and comments on reviewed works in operation planning coordination uncapacitated. 
Authors Value added/ comments 
(Homberger, 2010) The developed Simulated annealing method is based on the redundant binary coding for the MLULSP 
(Homberger et al., 
2010) 
The Borda maximin voting rule is used as a ranked-based voting rule of the proposals that are used to adapt a joint 
pheromone matrix. 
(Homberger et al., 
2011) 
The Borda maximin voting rule, maximize the welfare level of the worst-off group member, is used to select 
proposals and aims to avoid an early stagnation of the negotiation process . 
(Homberger, 2011) 
The mediator generates new proposals that the agents have to vote and with their votes and the Evolution 
Algorithm, the coordination mechanism works. To measure fairness the Rawls’s criterion is applied. 
(Buer et al., 2013) 
The encoded solutions are represented by a new and simplified search graph, compared to previous works and a 
modification of voting is used. 
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(Ziebuhr et al., 2013) 
The idea of the extended by a partway reset procedure in the Simulated Annealing is to overcome disagreements 
between agents more easily by resetting the search once in a while to earlier solutions and discriminating some 
agents randomly during the negotiation process. 
(Reiss et al., 2014) 
By computational tests showed that their approach outperforms upstream planning, but has some shortcomings 
when setup times have to be considered. 
(Buer et al., 2015) 
This paper introduced an inter-organisational lot-sizing problem that some agents are able to produce the same 
items and a side-payment with the Shapley formula. It performs better for small and medium sized instances. 
(Eslikizi et al., 2015) 
A mediator that uses simulated annealing organizes the negotiation process. In order to escape from a local 
negotiation optimum, side payments are integrated whose calculation is based on the Shapley value. More than one 
agent might produce items. 
(Homberger et al., 
2015) 
The method considers side payments via a modified voting procedure, which temporarily accepts non-improving 
solutions and negotiates side payments that leads to superior solutions for all agents. 
(Ziebuhr et al., 2015) 
It uses Simulated Annealing heuristics to assign products to rival agents and to coordinate production plans 
between different suppliers. 
Source: Own elaboration. 
4 Conclusion and future work. 
This work presents a systematic literature review of mathematical programming models with coordination 
mechanism for decentralised decision-making. Most of the models reviewed only consider tactical and 
operational levels and most problems are inter-company assuming trustful behaviour. Furthermore, the 
majority of the works reviewed look for a near global optimal solution. Additionally, the vast majority 
has used mechanism with the requirement of a mediator or a neutral agent. In addition, few of them have 
applied rolling horizons. The coordination mechanisms have been studied mainly without a specific 
sector except to the wood industry and chemical sector. The results have been tested mainly on specific 
cases conditions, therefore there is an opportunity to extend the coordination mechanisms to a general 
proposes and to applied them to others industrial sectors. 
As future research line, coordination mechanism at strategic level for more than two levels must be 
further studied. Another research line is the evaluation of the proposed coordination mechanisms in an 
opportunistic behaviour. Further research is to extend to real case studies the coordination mechanisms 
without mediator.  
If it is analysed the progress in these ten years with respect to Stadtler's (2007) conclusions, it can be 
emphasized that it is moving from being a subject for the research area to a ready-to-use product and one 
begins to glimpse its application in certain sectors such as wood and chemicals, but it still cannot be 
spoken about empirical research. However, there are still outstanding issues such as the analysis of fair 
benefits distribution among members of the supply chain, or organizational behaviour, communication or 
cultural aspects are mostly omitted in the design of SC schemes. The renegotiation of plans already 
accepted in successive rolling horizons or a holistic vision or the concept of covering several phases of 
collaboration have not yet been developed. Stadtler's statement that "companies are reluctant to share 
information and consider compensation to SC members required to achieve a mutually beneficial 
situation as a result of coordination" remains valid. 
The work presents the limitations that only those works with access from the Universitat Politècnica de 
València and the commented exclusions have been analysed, so that relevant works on coordination 
mechanisms not included may be missing (Rius-Sorolla et al., 2017). 
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